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AMERICAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
FOREIGN POLICY

Y 4.F 76/1:AM 3/21

American Public Attitudes Toward Fo...

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 27, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



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AMERICAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman) presiding.

Chairman HAMILTON. We meet today to consider American public attitudes toward foreign policy. We are in a transition period in American foreign policy: the United States is sorting out its role in the post-cold war world.

That is a difficult task. It is not occurring in a vacuum. As we see in the newspapers and on television, the United States is being called upon every day to help solve the world's problems. Whether it is the tragedy in Rwanda, turmoil in Haiti, stalemate in Bosnia, or the nuclear danger in Korea, the world is looking to the United States for leadership and it is difficult to turn our backs. As each crisis presents itself, U.S. policymakers must decide, "how much will we do?" How much can we do to solve the problems around the world? In contrast to the cold war, we don't have firm principles or clear objectives to always guide our policy.

Public support is crucial for any significant foreign policy initiative. Will the American people support an invasion of Haiti? Will Americans support sending U.S. troops to Bosnia to help enforce a peace agreement?

The public is, at best, ambivalent about an active U.S. role in the world. The public, we are told by the pollsters, is more interested in domestic problems. That makes it much more difficult for the President to conduct U.S. foreign policy during this time of transition.

The committee meets this morning to explore the public's mood on foreign policy, to find out what is behind those attitudes, and to examine how the President can get public support for the U.S. role in the world.

To examine these questions we have a distinguished panel. Daniel Yankelovich is chairman of DYG, Inc., founder of the Public Agenda Foundation and author of numerous books and articles on public opinion trends. Most recently, he was the editor of *Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy*.

Andrew Kohut is the director of the Times Mirror Center for the Public and the Press, which last year sponsored a major study of U.S. attitudes toward foreign policy, *America's Place in the World*.

He is also the founder of Princeton Survey Research Associates and was president of The Gallup Organization from 1979-89. He is currently President of the American Association of Public Opinion Research.

Frank Gaffney is director of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C., and host of The World this Week, a television show shown on public television affiliates across the country. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Reagan administration.

Gentlemen, we welcome you this morning.

Mr. Bereuter, do you have a statement?

Mr. BEREUTER. No, I do not.

Chairman HAMILTON. We will proceed directly with your opening comments and then turn to questions. We have your printed statements, of course, at least for Mr. Kohut and Mr. Yankelovich.

Mr. Gaffney, do you have a statement? I see it is coming to me right now.

We will turn now to our panel for their comments before we go to questions. I would ask you to keep your opening comments relatively brief, if you would.

Mr. Gaffney.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK GAFFNEY, JR., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY

Mr. GAFFNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be able to contribute, I hope—in a small way—to your committee's deliberations on what I consider to be an absolutely fundamental and certainly most vexing issue, namely, how can the support of the American people be developed and maintained for the sort of foreign policy that a global power like the United States must have?

I confess to having strong views on this subject. I do not approach it as my colleagues on this panel do from the perspective of political scientist, skilled in quantitative methods of analysis; but rather as a former policymaker and participant in the policy debate.

Throughout my 18 or so years in this field, I have believed that the world was a better and safer place if a strong and engaged America played a decisive role in its affairs. As you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, there are those who would have you believe that such a policy is anathema to the American people, that they are, if not reflexively, certainly at the moment isolationist and determined to shrink from global leadership and its costs. I believe this contention to be inaccurate, and as dangerous for U.S. international interests as it is incorrect.

In my personal experience, the vast majority of Americans exhibit a native common sense about the importance of U.S. engagement in the world. To be sure, they do not want American power squandered, inappropriately exercised, or to the extent possible, utilized without the support and help of our allies. Still, they recognize that it is important for the United States to have the power to influence international affairs and to defend its interests around the globe.

As I imagine we will be talking about polling data, one, I think, that is instructive on this score is a poll that has been conducted most years—it would seem between March of 1947 and at least 1993—by the National Opinion Research Center, which has established that between 61 and 79 percent of those questioned routinely agree that “it will be best for the future of this country if we take an active role in world affairs.” The highest percentage received for the alternative of “staying out” of world affairs was just 36 percent. That was in 1975. The average support enjoyed by such isolationist opinion was roughly 28 percent.

I think that more recent polls on more specialized issues—from the presence of U.S. forces in Europe to preserving and expanding NATO, to responding militarily, if necessary, to North Korea’s nuclear threat, to the decision to spend additional resources to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons technology—all offer further evidence of this general base of support for an engaged and strong America.

How is one to square this assessment with the conventional wisdom which is, to varying degrees, also borne out by polling data that the public is in an isolationist mood, convinced we must concentrate resources and energy on domestic concerns, rather than international ones, and opposed to the use of military power overseas?

I must tell you, I believe the answer lies primarily in a failure of American leadership. In the absence of a clear sense of the vision, direction, and purpose for U.S. foreign and defense policies, the public in this country—like its counterparts in other democracies elsewhere—is susceptible to the temptation to believe that the world can be safely ignored. I am afraid this is particularly true when our leaders pander to such sentiments either because they themselves lack a sense of the needed vision, direction, and purpose, or because they think it is the safest route to political popularity.

As those of you on this committee know, this is not unique to the present moment. History throughout this century has signaled, has demonstrated the phenomenon of cycles of American involvement, followed by apathy and disengagement, followed by generally a recognition we had overdone it—cutting our defense expenditures and capabilities, withdrawing from world affairs—only to find that we had to throw money, and in many cases lives, back into trying to recover from that syndrome.

If this phenomenon is not unprecedented, it is nonetheless acutely in evidence at this juncture. Without underestimating—and I imagine we will talk at length about it—the contributions being made to its emergence by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent tectonic shifts that that has created and, of course, the development of instantaneous global television news, in my view, the principal responsibility for popular myopia about security policy lies with the President and his administration. Certainly the others—the Soviet, television angles do serve to exacerbate a problem that arises largely from Presidential shortcomings.

I will not belabor the point, but I think it is an open secret that Mr. Clinton’s past inexperience with foreign affairs has translated into discomfort on his part in dealing with this area of public pol-

icy. This discomfort, in turn, gives rise to a reluctance to devote the time and energy required to conduct security policy effectively and routinely. It also gives rise to a tendency, I am afraid, to delegate unduly responsibility for the management of this part of the portfolio. Given the weaknesses of many on whose shoulders that responsibility devolves, it is a formula for real problems.

The result has been, in the first instance, a pattern of responses to nondomestic challenges that have generally been expediency driven, shortsighted and ad hoc in nature. They have played to the public's readiness to focus on domestic problems even as they have given rise to a growing lack of confidence in the Clinton administration's stewardship in foreign affairs.

I regret to say that I think the legislative branch bears some responsibility in this respect as well. I am afraid, by failing to address directly the abiding dangers in the world, the abiding interests we have and the need to be able to address them, if necessary, militarily, certainly through an effective and aggressive diplomacy, we are seeing the dangers magnified of this inadequate leadership, attention and resources given to world affairs. The manifestations of this include: the demobilization—I repeat, demobilization—of the U.S. Armed Forces; the deconstruction of key security-related institutions; unilateral disarmament in important respects; the diversion of needed military resources to nondefense-related tasks; and the demoralization of the American military. I would be happy to elaborate on those points if you would like.

The question arises as to what to do about this? I would suggest there are three key things that need to be done.

One, certainly foremost, the President and his team need to conceptualize and articulate a coherent security policy, one that is compatible with the nation's need to be able to engage decisively in world affairs. This will require, I believe, reversing a number of decisions that have been made in this area in recent years, not the least the subordinating of our foreign policy decisionmaking to international organizations and lowest-common-denominator consensuses.

More importantly, it will demand a degree of Presidential involvement, leadership, and consistency that have not been evident of late.

Secondly, U.S. foreign policy cannot be either effectively conceived or successfully executed on the basis of polling data, focus groups, or less sophisticated means of determining which way the political winds are blowing. I think you are all aware this phenomenon reached absurd proportions over the administration's recent, almost hourly, changes in policy about Haiti, apparently in response to continuous recalibrations based upon the perception that there were changing attitudes on the part of various parts of the public, press or special interest groups.

The President has, in my view, the responsibility to lead, not merely represent the people of the United States. If the direction of his leadership is, broadly speaking, in tune with the fundamentals of a principled, engaged and powerful America, it will enjoy popular support. If it is not, no amount of misleading rhetoric, cynical packaging or manipulative spin control will make it palatable to the public.

Third and finally, the President, his advisers, and the Congress must be held accountable to a greater degree than has generally been the case in recent years for decisions that are at cross-purposes with the common sense and traditional desires of the American people. In our small way, we at the Center for Security Policy are trying to call attention to such problems: as the apparent permanent vulnerability of this country to ballistic missile attack; the dangers of committing U.S. forces to deployment on the Golan Heights without careful deliberation and prior debate; liquidation of America's nuclear deterrent now under way; the folly of interest in this committee of abandoning controls on the export of dual-use technology; and the risks involved in believing the world can be rid of chemical and biological weapons via arms control.

These are just examples of policies now under way that I believe do not comport with long-standing American public opinion and views.

Establishing and maintaining accountability is obviously a very big job. It is incumbent upon both the press and members of this body to play their roles in doing so as well.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would just note, if we had in the past the luxury of exhibiting Presidential irresoluteness and national indifference to world affairs, we clearly do not have that luxury today. Real, if ill-defined, threats to our security interests are emerging. Strategic developments are creating possibly irreversible economic and political fissures with long-time allies; and the interaction between domestic financial security and international money flows is becoming ever more direct and volatile.

On the last point, I would call to your attention a very thoughtful piece in last week's Outlook section of the *Washington Post* by Kevin Phillips, in which he draws a connection between what happens to currency market valuation of the dollar and perceptions, both domestic and international, of American leadership, policy and purposefulness. If no other reason might be found—and I think there are plenty—for returning to the principled, reliable and assertive U.S. security policies that have traditionally commanded respect internationally and enjoyed strong support at home, this phenomenon in the currency markets provides ample grounds for doing so.

Thank you very much.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Kohut.

STATEMENT OF ANDREW KOHUT, DIRECTOR, TIMES MIRROR CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS

Mr. KOHUT. I am happy to be here and share the findings of our surveys and other analyses we have made about public opinion and the use of force, which I will not cover in my opening remarks but hope to talk to you about in some of the subsequent discussions.

My remarks today are principally drawn from the results of surveys we conducted of the American public and American leadership groups about America's place in the post-cold war world. We not only surveyed the public at large but also surveyed groups of influential Americans, including top security and foreign affairs specialists, business leaders, scientists, governors, big city mayors, and others.

In analyzing the survey, which was conducted about a year ago, we observed something akin to a foreign policy identity crisis among influential Americans. Our survey of opinion leaders revealed a lack of consensus on most of the fundamental questions that we asked. These questions included:

Is it a safer world?

What should the United States stand for?

What are our international goals and priorities?

What leadership role should the United States play?

On each question we found our samples of influential Americans divided, and/or reflecting differing points of view and priorities.

The values that animated our foreign policy for 40 years now elicit equivocal responses from American leadership groups. Influentials seem wary about promoting democracy, exporting capitalism and demanding human rights. In broad terms, the influentials we surveyed endorsed a dual imperative of maintaining world stability and dealing with global economic issues, but beyond that there seems to be little agreement about the specific goals of American foreign policy.

If anything, there was a more coherent pattern of views among the American public as we questioned them over a number of surveys. Basically, the public wants a foreign policy that serves its domestic agenda. When questioned about its foreign policy priorities, the public's top three replies all had domestic consequences: strengthen the U.S. economy, stop drug trafficking and stem illegal immigration. Traditional international concerns are given little emphasis today. Only 23 percent of the public, for example, said that ensuring that democracy succeeds in Russia should be a top foreign policy priority of the United States.

Nonetheless, the American public remains, on balance, internationalist in its outlook. It is not ready to withdraw from the world. Most notably, public support for the United Nations is much more substantial than it was 10 years ago. But at the same time Americans are preoccupied with their own concerns and somewhat indifferent to international events. Without the prism of anticommunism, connections and consequences of U.S. actions around the world are less clear. Our periodic news interest survey finds very small percentages of the public paying attention to important international stories such as the war in Bosnia and unrest in Haiti. Similarly, the public has paid little attention to events unfolding in Rwanda and the Ukraine. For example, at no point in the past 2 years have we found more than 20 percent of Americans able to identify the Serbs as the protagonists of the Bosnian Muslims.

Protecting the nation's oil supplies and preventing nuclear proliferation are the only foreign policy priorities shared by a majority of the public and a majority of the leadership groups that we surveyed. For the public, more so than for the leaders, global issues that have a clear connection to domestic concerns represent new potential rallying cries. Solving global environmental problems, controlling population growth and combating drugs were given higher priority ratings by the public than by many leadership groups.

The biggest gulf between the public and influential Americans centers on the kind of world leadership role we should play. Neither group thinks the United States should be the one nation that leads the world. Both want the United States to share leadership with our allies. However, influentials favor a first-among-equals role for the United States while the public does not want us to play a more assertive role than that of other leading nations.

Finally, even after Somalia, the public is not disposed to turn its back on the world to help with humanitarian efforts. However, it is very cautious of involvement in world conflicts and strongly rejects the United States assuming the role of international policeman in Africa, Asia and even in this hemisphere. Public opinion about U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations is less clear-cut. Multilateralism, especially U.S. sponsorship, plays a crucial roll in mustering public support for military involvements.

I think I will leave it at that.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Yankelovich.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL YANKELOVICH, CHAIRMAN, DYG INC.

Mr. YANKELOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In my opening statement, I would like to make two points. The first is to emphasize the distinction between the public's settled opinions and their unsettled opinions. Leaders as can be responsive to the public only if they have a solid grasp of what the public voice is really saying, and it is very difficult to get this information from public opinion polls because they do not distinguish the public's convictions from its sentiments at the moment.

Most opinions on foreign policy are unsettled, particularly on specific issues such as Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, North Korea and so forth. Where you find settled opinions is on judgments that Americans have reached after long deliberation. These are fundamental in character and therefore less volatile than on issues of the day; and I would like to cite here a handful of these settled convictions because I think they give leadership a way of predicting where the public will come out after it has had a chance to wrestle with some specific issues.

First and foremost is the public's settled conviction that the United States has strong leadership responsibilities in the world. It must, therefore, not be sidetracked into isolationism. The public's current preoccupation with domestic concerns should not be mistaken for neo-isolationism.

I find it very striking that all three of us coming from different perspectives have reached that conclusion. It is a well-documented conclusion that flies in the face of the conventional wisdom, and so is worth emphasizing.

A second settled opinion is that the economic interests of the United States should, wherever possible, have priority over our military and human rights interests. Serious threats to national security must, of course, always come before economics. And low-cost, low-sacrifice human rights initiatives that express our humanitarian ideals are also acceptable. But in today's brutal global economy, it is time to put economic interests on the foreign policy front burner.

Another settled opinion is that the United States must not be suckered into playing the role of the world's policeman *by itself*.

Another firmly held view is that whenever sacrifice is demanded, the public ought to be involved. An excellent model of that kind of involvement was the televised congressional debate preceding the Iraqi intervention. The debate was a very effective way of achieving public consensus.

Finally, the majority view of the public is that the United States ought to hang tough in the pursuit of American interests, and that there are times when force and pressure are needed, even if this offends some of our fellow citizens.

This is not a complete list of the public's convictions, but it will give you more reliable guidance than public opinion polls which reflect transient opinions at the moment.

My second point responds to the committee's invitation to suggest ways to build public support for an active U.S. role in the world. I would like to offer three pieces of advice.

The first relates to giving economic interests priority. The most direct way to build public support is to find opportunities for foreign policy initiatives that create good jobs for Americans and to put these initiatives high on the foreign policy agenda. Once the public is convinced, which they are not now, that we are finally giving priority to our Nation's economic interests, it will be much easier to build support for more traditional foreign policy objectives. The emphasis today on traditional foreign policy frustrates the public which is looking for a greater emphasis on the economic side.

A second way to build public support is to present the public with a plan for how the United States ought to go about building the world policeman role. This is a subject of great confusion in the public mind because Americans do not want the United States to fill it unilaterally, yet they know it needs to be filled.

What role should the United States play?

What role should the U.N. play?

What role should our allies play?

How can we make steady progress toward this goal, even if it takes a number of years to accomplish?

Voters are capable of exercising patience—if, and only if, they are brought into the picture.

A third strategy for building public support relates to the press. The press is irresistibly drawn toward all instances of decisionmaking on foreign policy that betray indecision, waffling, and inconsistency. This preoccupation with process undermines public confidence even when ultimate decisions are sound and consonant with public values.

The media's excessive focus on process gives the public the erroneous impression that past foreign policy decisions were models of constancy, in sharp contrast to present-day policymaking, whereas the real difference between past and present is that earlier leaders were more successful in keeping the press out of the kitchen. Waiting until decisions are firm before sharing them with the press doesn't mean violating the public's right to know; it does mean less thinking out loud, sending out fewer trial balloons, less leaking, less sharing of every passing thought with the press.

Thank you.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you. Thank you very much for your opening statements, gentlemen.

Let's turn now to questions.

CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICYMAKING ENVIRONMENT

I remember the story—I don't know whether it is true or not, but it is a good story—Harry Truman was asked one time, who makes American foreign policy? His response was, I make American foreign policy.

I am not enough of a historian to know whether Mr. Truman was right or not, but historically it is probably true that American foreign policy has been made by a very, very few people, then announced. Sort of a top-down situation.

Foreign policy, I guess, has always been the province of the elite in this country in many respects. So the first question is, is that still the case? Or do we have a situation today where that has changed?

Mr. Kohut, I noticed in your statement this rather extraordinary fact that only about 20 percent of Americans were able to identify the Serbs as the opponents of the Bosnian Muslims.

What kind of an environment are we in now with regard to the making of American foreign policy? Was President Truman right in his day but wrong today? Are we in a situation now where American foreign policy is much more broadly based than it once was?

FACTORS AFFECTING LATITUDE OF POLICYMAKERS

Mr. KOHUT. I think the relationship between the public and leadership with regard to foreign policy is a very unusual one. More than ever before, I think the American public is indifferent to the specifics of what is going on in the world, in large part because the lack of a Communist threat has lessened the urgency with which Americans follow what is happening in the Balkans or what is happening in Africa or Asia.

But on the other hand, we have a situation where satellite television technology, real-time technology news connects people to events as they are happening.

I would commend to you a Ph.D. dissertation by Maxine Issacs at the University of Maryland in which she looked at the connections between the way the public feels about a number of events that have been broadcast on television—for example, Tiananmen Square and the coup in the Soviet Union—and showed a very small connection between how the public felt and how leadership groups expressed themselves on these issues because the public could look in via CNN, C-SPAN, and even the traditional broadcast networks at what was actually happening. In a way, she hypothesizes, there is less of a leadership-follower relationship in foreign policy than there was as Walter Lippman described it in the 1920's.

I think there is a great deal of truth to that, but that is juxtaposed with a public that on a day-to-day basis is more indifferent than perhaps ever before to what is happening in smaller areas around the world. The peripheral foreign policy issues and crises no longer engage the public's interest, primarily because they do

not see a ready connection between what is happening in the Balkans to what is going to happen in Boise, Idaho.

So we have a very strange situation because leadership can do more without the public paying a great deal of attention in some cases. But in other cases, the public is participating by watching. Americans watched the landing of troops in Somalia in a way they never watched the landing of troops in Vietnam, and certainly not in Korea.

That is my comment to the question.

CONNECTION BETWEEN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES

Mr. YANKELOVICH. I would like to offer a somewhat different answer to the question.

Yes, there has been a change. In the past, foreign policy was pretty much the exclusive property of the President and a small foreign policy elite. That situation began to change in the 1970's and has continued to change for two reasons. First, the nature of foreign policy issues have changed in the sense that they have more far-reaching domestic consequences. And even if the policies do not have direct domestic consequences, it is people's feeling that we have a limited amount of resources and attention; if these are diverted to foreign policy, they will be subtracted from the domestic side.

The second lesson is that in the past 20 years or so there has been a marked increase in public demand for greater engagement and more direct involvement. For all practical purposes, the old distinction between domestic and foreign policy, as far as leadership is concerned, has broken down. You might as well look at foreign policy issues in exactly the same way that you look at domestic issues.

VACUUM OF LEADERSHIP

Mr. GAFFNEY. Very quickly, Mr. Chairman, I think Harry Truman, if in fact he said that, was right. I think that it is still the case that the President of the United States is the decisive force in shaping American foreign policy.

What we have witnessed really beginning with some Bush administration policies and continuing under the present administration has been a certain vacuum of leadership on the part of the President that has encouraged the greater emergence or influence of some of the factors my colleagues referred to. I think they are probably part of the landscape from here on out for reasons that have been addressed, not the least of which is greater access to information on the part of the public and certainly the ferocity with which the public pulse is taken by people here, as elsewhere.

But in the end, I think that the public, particularly in areas where the information is not very clear, or the interests of the United States need to be made clear, the President plays a decisive role. In the absence of it, you will not get foreign policy; you will get, basically, paralysis. That is what really troubles me about the present moment.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Bereuter.

PUBLIC VIEWS ON MULTILATERALISM

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. I noticed that all three of you have commented directly or indirectly upon the peacekeeping function, who is to be the cop on the block, or multilateralism.

Mr. Gaffney, you mentioned that the American public, if possible, wants American manpower to be utilized for the support and help of our allies.

Mr. Kohut, you mentioned the multilaterals, especially U.N. sponsorship, play a crucial role in mustering American support for military involvement.

Mr. Yankelovich, you note that the subtle opinion is the United States must not be suckered into playing the role of the world's policeman by itself.

It is clear that we see Americans wanting to involve our allies in military operations. Yet, at the same time, based upon contact from my constituents, it seems to me that they are concerned about some aspects of multilateral institutions taking a role away from the United States. They are concerned about taking decisionmaking away.

So, in fact, the latest element of the conspiracy theory crowd relates to the United Nations taking away options from the United States or other international institutions. Is it that they are willing to have peacekeeping operations or military operations take place on an ad hoc basis that preserves an American leadership role in a more direct way? What do you think about this switch in thought, if that is what it is?

AMBIVALENCE OF PUBLIC TOWARD MULTILATERAL APPROACH

Mr. YANKELOVICH. One of the confusing aspects of looking at today's foreign policy is that people hold such conflicting and ambivalent views.

The dominant view is the concern that we not go it alone. I used the word "suckered" advisedly. Americans feel it is easy for us to be gulled into holding the bag; Everybody else backs off and there we are, like fools, caught alone in a thankless task.

That is a very powerful feeling. The way people deal with it is to look for our allies to share the burden. If we can do it with others, it makes sense. So, over and over again, you find support for force and for involvement if it is done with others; and almost no support for unilateral action.

Now, at the same time, there is a lingering concern that we not lose our leadership and our hegemony, and have our prerogatives taken over by the U.N. which is not always effective or by our allies who are not always effective.

A part of the leadership concern that Mr. Gaffney has expressed is valid in the sense that clear, strong leadership would help the public engage in some of these conflicts and resolve them.

Mr. BEREUTER. The latest example, by the way, of the recent scare story is the proposed World Trade Organization and ridiculous ads on TV today which are suggesting that they will preempt Congress' ability to make laws and to charge the executive branch with the enforcement of those laws.

Mr. YANKELOVICH. The majority after a bit of thought seems always to be willing to come down on supporting constructive internationalism, if we do it with others.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING

Mr. KOHUT. I would like to make a distinction in public opinion.

We find no support, very little support for peace, or peacemaking, multilateral or unilateral; but much more support for peacekeeping.

The other distinction that I think is important to make is that the American public has strong reservations about American forces serving under a U.N. command, while American leadership groups strongly approve of that, or at least did a year ago. There is a big difference between the way leadership groups and the public feel on that issue; but the first point, the distinction between peacemaking and peacekeeping, is a very substantial one.

You can get American public support for U.S. military participation to keep a stable situation stable; but it is extremely difficult, based upon the polls we looked at, to get public support where American troops are playing the role of sheriff, in Somalia or elsewhere.

Mr. BEREUTER. I wonder if any of you pollsters have any results related to the word "multilateralism" itself?

Mr. KOHUT. It is not a word I use.

Mr. BEREUTER. Does that have negative connotations yet, or not?

Mr. YANKELOVICH. I don't think it is a people word; it is an expert word.

THE DESERT STORM MODEL

Mr. GAFFNEY. One quick observation. It seems to me that Desert Storm offered a model of how you could have broad public support pursuant to Presidential leadership and congressional involvement for an international undertaking that had a U.N. flavor to it but was clearly a U.S. show. The decisive thing, in my view, was not only that the President got squared away and figured out what he wanted to do and pursued a program of putting it into place—preparing the public to do it, securing congressional support for it and so on—but I would argue, most decisively, that he had military capability at his disposal to do it alone, if necessary.

I would argue that that fact and the perception of that fact on the part of our friends in the U.N. was absolutely instrumental to getting the U.N.'s approval and getting the kind of legitimacy that that approval connoted.

But I think, there was a case of peacemaking that enjoyed the requisite support and was ultimately crucial, I think, to anything we would like to have come out of this so-called post-cold war era; but it was fundamentally rooted in both American leadership and American wherewithal to pursue its own course unilaterally, if necessary.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Lantos.

FAILED POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our distinguished panel for their very valuable contribution. I would like to take a different tack from what we have been doing thus far. I want to raise some issues and invite your comments.

I would like to offer as a point of departure the Persian Gulf war, which I think so clearly demonstrates both the success and the failure of leadership. As one who strongly supported the President in the Persian Gulf war, I was equally appalled by the failure of the Bush administration to finish the job on Saddam Hussein, which clearly represented a total collapse of Presidential leadership. With the growing economic pressures and the growing pressure to remove sanctions, Iraq will again be a huge buyer of products, including sophisticated military weaponry, and some of our allies are drooling at the prospect of sales to Iraq. This could have been prevented had the Presidential leadership that Mr. Bush so ably demonstrated at the beginning of the Persian Gulf war continued through to the conclusion of that effort.

FAILURE OF YUGOSLAV POLICY

I also must say that in terms of leadership, which I think is the key element here, the total failure of U.S. policy with respect to the former Yugoslav state is a clear indication that the American public understandably cannot be a substitute for the government's lack of leadership, foresight, and lack of understanding. It is unrealistic to expect the public at large to be an expert on the intricacies of the history of the Balkans and to project realistically what will happen if Yugoslavia breaks up and how to prevent this or how to deal with it in a peaceful fashion.

DISTORTED PICTURE PRESENTED BY TELEVISION

I also would like, at the outset, to comment on the much overrated importance of instantaneous global television on public understanding, because what instantaneous global television offers is a picture of what television chooses to show, but it does not provide any more insight into causality, background, long-term developments, underlying issues; so we have an illusion of public information and understanding without the substance of it.

The public sees what it is shown, the public does not see what it is not shown; and the public, by seeing pictures, does not clearly understand what forces are at play. This is almost analogous to a visible illness and an invisible illness. An invisible illness, like diabetes, may be much more dangerous than many visible illnesses. We are confronted with a public that can tune in on CNN and see everything that CNN shows and know nothing about anything that CNN doesn't show.

PUBLIC DESIRE FOR COST-FREE FOREIGN POLICY

Now, I find two or three areas that give me profound concern. The first of these is that there is either an articulated or an implicit assumption that the conduct of foreign policy by the one remaining superpower on the face of this planet must be cost-free, price-free, and sacrifice-free. It seems to me that the absurdity of

this becomes clear when, on the one hand, hundreds of thousands of people die annually as a result of domestic violence, drugs, automobile accidents, tobacco smoking, et cetera.

The American people have become totally immunized and desensitized to the hundreds of thousands of unnecessary deaths that take place as a result of eating habits, smoking habits, drinking habits, driving habits, assault weapons, you name it; but when a handful of individuals in the military, all of whom are volunteers, are hurt, there is an instant demand for a 180-degree turnabout in U.S. foreign policy.

I am as sensitive to a single life being lost as anybody in this room, but our conduct of foreign policy will not improve under any administration until this absurdity is finally going to penetrate the consciousness of the American public that we routinely accept hundreds of thousands of unnecessary deaths through domestic developments, from smoking to driving, but are totally unwilling to accept any cost in the conduct of foreign policy.

I would also like to have you gentlemen comment on one more item, if I may.

It seems to me that there is very little attempt on the part of the leadership, both in the previous administration and in many ways this one now, in teaching the lesson that deterrence is infinitely less costly than an attempt to clean up the mess. When we had testimony last week on the Rwandan crisis, it was obvious to those of us who participated in that hearing that with a tiny fraction of the financial and physical involvement of the civilized world, half a million deaths could have been prevented, a cholera epidemic could have been prevented, and the gigantic cost of rebuilding whatever is to be rebuilt there could have been achieved.

This is equally true with respect to Yugoslavia. This is equally true with respect to all of the issues we are dealing with.

EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

A final observation I would like you to comment on relates to Mr. Yankelovich's accurate reporting of the emphasis the public places on economic issues.

You clearly are correct. To whatever extent this is not approached with realism, we will be totally incapable of dealing with the primacy of economic matters by allies and others who again will sell everything from nuclear weapons technology to you-name-it to the Iranians of this world. So we cannot blithely say that it is only understandable that economic criteria are more important than anything else on our part, while objecting to the French or the Japanese or the Germans using that same short-term, stupid, financial calculus as the guiding principle for their foreign policy.

I would be grateful if you would comment on my remarks.

ASSESSING PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF RISK

Mr. YANKELOVICH. Thank you. I would like to comment on all three points, if I may.

First, I would like to speak to what you call the absurdity of assuming that we can have a risk-free, sacrifice-free foreign policy. I don't think that is a valid view of the public attitude. Americans do draw lessons from experience. The absurdity comes, I believe,

from a false lesson drawn not by the public, but by experts and observers to the public's reaction to Somalia. When we had a few casualties in Somalia, the inference was drawn that Americans don't want to take that kind of risk. I think that was an erroneous interpretation.

The public was distressed by what happened in Somalia not because there were casualties, but because the mission had been presented initially as a purely humanitarian mission. In fact, it had not even been presented or debated—it was simply announced. People accepted it as long as it seemed to be a low-cost humanitarian effort. It was when the rules of the game changed in mid-stream (mission creep) and people began to perceive that we were getting involved in the internal affairs of Somalia, that they said, "Hey, wait a minute, that's not what we supported; that is not in America's interests."

I have looked very carefully at opinion poll data to try to assess the public's willingness to accept risk. I would say that, unlike the expert misinterpretation of the Somalia reaction, the public's view is that if you take the three main thrusts of global objectives of foreign policy—the concern with national security, the concern with our economic interests, and the concern with our humanitarian, human rights interests, that there is a hierarchy of risk. If it is a real threat to our national security, people will accept major risk. If the policy is in the pursuit of important economic interests, people will accept moderate risks. If it is in pursuit of some of the humanitarian goals of American policy at this particular historic moment, there is less willingness to accept risk.

So the risk, I believe, is a function of the purpose and the extent to which there is a direct threat to the United States.

IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRACY-BUILDING

Mr. LANTOS. May I just interject something?

Mr. YANKELOVICH. Yes.

Mr. LANTOS. You stipulate three areas Mr. Yankelovich: national security, economic, and humanitarian—human rights interests. Where do you fit in, or do you, democracy-building as a prime national foreign policy goal? It is self-evident to me that we have a tremendously powerful national interest in building open and democratic societies because in the long run, open and democratic societies do not represent a threat to the United States.

To take the breakup of the Soviet Union as an example, clearly the collapse of the Soviet Union in the short term is very desirable from a national security point of view. Humanitarian concerns are met to the extent that human rights abuses in the Soviet Union are much less today than they used to be; whatever economic relations we have are positive. But unless we are preoccupied with building an open and democratic society in what used to be the Soviet Union, sooner or later, we will have an enormous cost to pay by seeing another totalitarian, possibly imperialist and aggressive power emerge.

EDUCATING PUBLIC ON THE VALUE OF DETERRENCE

Mr. YANKELOVICH. That bears on the second point on which you asked for comment.

You make a point, correctly, that deterrence is less costly than cleaning up the mess. That is true. That is a leadership function. It is a leadership function not only with respect to responding to a crisis that arises, but with respect to offering the public a foreign policy strategy in advance of a crisis.

We have overlearned some lessons, mislearned some lessons, underlearned others. We have not learned the lesson about the importance of other countries being democracies, and how that affects our future, particularly with respect to the Soviet Union.

People do not make connections by themselves. It is up to leadership to help make the connections. Those connections have not been made with the public.

I have some comments on some of your other points, but I think I should let my colleagues make their observations.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Gaffney.

CAUTION ADVISED ON POTENTIAL GOLAN MISSION

Mr. GAFFNEY. Mr. Chairman, I can be fairly brief. I think I agree with everything you said, Congressman. I would make four quick points if I may.

I think the false expectations of the invulnerability of American peacekeepers is the problem here. There has been a failure to address, a priori, before committing forces to these peacekeeping missions that some may be lost and explaining to the public why that is a bearable burden. I think that, rather than the specifics of the case in Somalia, precipitated the backlash.

I must tell you the absolute determination to avoid thinking through the decision of putting American troops at risk on the Golan Heights prior to a commitment to do so is setting us up for precisely the same reaction and perhaps even more strategically significant repercussions.

Mr. BERMAN. Prior to doing what?

Mr. GAFFNEY. Putting American troops on the Golan Heights as part of the settlement that is now in the offing between Syria and Israel. I would like to see people evaluate the risks of this prior to the commitment to it being made.

A second point, very quickly, is that I think your point is very well taken about the cost-benefits of deterrence. It needs to be said that you need to invest in deterrent capability, however, it is too late after you decide you would like to have it to do so. And you have to be willing to exercise military force in order to have a credible deterrent in the future.

BUDGETARY CONSEQUENCES OF FAILED DETERRENCE

It is also important to make the point, I think, that the failure to make those investments and subsequently pay the costs of failing to deter means that, you are right, costs are going to be paid out of somebody else's priorities and accounts. I am concerned, frankly, when I hear \$250 million is going to be spent on a Rwanda operation—not because there are not compelling humanitarian reasons—but because I don't know where the resources are coming from. I suspect they will come out of the defense budget. That means we will be even less ready, less capable to provide deter-

rence elsewhere when we need to. There seems to be no process whatsoever for deliberating about that kind of decision beforehand.

EXPORT OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES

Thirdly, I would like to say with respect to your point about the short-sightedness, short-term mentality of people, with respect particularly to the sale of dangerous dual-use technologies that I commend Chairman Hamilton and Ranking Member Gilman for the efforts I understand you are making to try to undo some of the decisions that the subcommittee—a subcommittee of this committee, has made that would compound that problem immensely, not only for foreign competitors, but for American companies selling this dangerous technology as well.

CAUTION ON HAITI INTERVENTION

Finally, I think your point about democracy-building is a very important one. I personally subscribe to it greatly. We are in serious danger, however, I am afraid of confusing democracy with the process of a vote. I see this in Haiti at the moment. I think it is perfectly obvious that we have a situation here of one man, one vote, one time producing through a nominally democratic process a very unlikely democrat; and we are about, I believe, to commit U.S. forces in a mission to restore him and his government to power, which I think will entail long-term commitments on our part, especially if, in fact, we have any desire to see a real democracy take root in Haiti.

Thank you, sir.

QUALIFIED PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF CASUALTIES

Mr. KOHUT. I would just like to endorse some of the things my colleagues have said about how Somalia—the reaction to Somalia was not an indictment of the American public's ability to accept casualties, but rather its discontent with the mission. Originally, it was seen as a mission to provide humanitarian aid; the television screen went blank on it every couple of months. The next thing the public knew, we were chasing warlords and nation-building and playing sheriff.

I don't think you should draw the conclusion that the American public will not accept casualties on the basis of what happened in Somalia. The point is, though, there are relatively few things the American public is willing to accept casualties for.

Our polls point to two high-priority definitions of what our national interests are: one, stop nuclear proliferation; two, protect our oil supply. After that, there is precious little. I think that is where we get to the point of this issue of deterrence. It is making the connections between other less clear-cut things in the American national interest where leadership is so vital.

With regard to democracy-building, the American public approves of democracy-building, but is not willing to make major investments in it if these situations are not seen as clearly in the country's interests.

PRIMACY OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Mr. YANKELOVICH. That is such a critical point on the relative importance of these priorities.

I would like to try to make a final connection. On this matter of the primacy of economic interests and American interests, if you take the issue of aid to Russia, there is a lot of ambivalence on the part of the American public.

When you talk to people in focus groups, what comes out is the fear that we are going to do with Russia what we did with Germany and Japan after the war: Build them up and make them strong at our expense, at a time when we are suffering as a nation.

It would not take much to make the connection between aid to Russia and how our future economic interests might be advanced by such aid, but the connection has not been made. You have to remember that we are coming from a period of 40 years where foreign policy and the people trained in it have been focused on national security and, to some extent, human rights issues, and not on economics.

Americans are not asking that every single aspect of American foreign policy be economic in character, but they are asking that there be some important emphasis on our economic interests, which they do not feel is happening. If they felt that was the case, they would then buy into some of these other efforts.

If the foreign policy of the United States is a litany comprised of Haiti, North Korea, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, et cetera, while Americans are very worried and troubled about our own nation, there will be a backlash.

Chairman HAMILTON. The Chair wants to move our discussion along. We have a lot of members here that have not had an opportunity to participate. I appreciate it very much when you can keep your comments sharp.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

HISTORY OF LOW SUPPORT FOR PROTRACTED CONFLICT

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to keep my questions concise as well.

I may be wrong, but it seems to me from my read of history that the American people have never been able to maintain support for long, drawn-out bloodletting. I don't care if it was the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, or the Civil War. The Spanish-American War was over in 3 months—a great deal of support was given because it was over in 3 months.

World War I was over in a short period of time; even then, there was—it seemed to be a upsurge of opposition in the Midwest during the latter part of World War I.

World War II was the only time we were attacked, et cetera, et cetera.

Korea and Vietnam were long, drawn-out bloodletting affairs and the American people, I think justifiably, perceived that political leadership was not being provided that could have won those wars.

In terms of the post-cold war world, however, I seem to be receiving a different reading. I want to throw this out to the panel in terms of how much support Americans are willing to give in terms

of multilateral operations and depending upon multilateralism in general. I don't get the read you do on that.

My constituents are very, very suspicious of putting American troops under U.N. command. A lot of them are willing to let America use force when necessary, but only for our own interests, and not to be part of some major operation in which our troops are just one part of the cog.

What is your opinion on that?

ANTI-U.N. SENTIMENT

Mr. GAFFNEY. If I may, I just was trying to get at that point in my response to Congressman Bereuter's question. I think that there is this strong sentiment that the U.N. cannot be trusted to look after our interests, and I think there is reason to believe that. The way it seems to work—and I think the way it has particularly been working under this administration—is that the U.N. will get us involved where we do not have any interests; and where we do have vital interests, they are likely to impede our dealing with it effectively.

That may be a hangover from previous experience with the U.N., as much as the recent past; but I think it does give rise to this—the importance of having the alternative available to us, at the very least, if we do not want to use it, at least of being able to act unilaterally and use that as a vehicle to get action where we want to have it take place.

DEBATE ON VALUE OF MULTILATERALISM

Mr. KOHUT. Multilateralism to the American public means the United States not going it alone: I think the Gulf war gives us the best example of how levels of support for military involvement in the war really changed after the Security Council vote in November of 1990.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I disagree with that. I think the Times Mirror Corporation changed after that. I would have to tell you that while most liberal intellectuals' attitudes changed after that, the American people's attitudes didn't change.

Mr. KOHUT. I am quoting Gallup surveys, not Times Mirror surveys.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would suggest if that war went on and on and on, dragged on, and this would have occurred if the people in this House prevented us from conducting offensive operations, we would have been stuck out in the middle of the desert for a couple of years. Additionally, I think you would have found there wasn't a support for multilateralism and we would have been forced to retreat with our tail between our legs.

PUBLIC RESPONSE TO POST-COLD WAR POLICY

One last thought and question I want to shoot to the panel: That is, I believe that American foreign policy in the post-cold war world will depend not only on unilateralism—our ability to make decisions and be willing to go out and do it on our own and provide that leadership—but also the ability to do things we didn't have to do during the cold war—for example, decapitation of leaders in

Third World countries that may have possession of weapons of mass destruction; covert operations; and unconventional warfare which were feared during the cold war because of the possibility of conflict escalation between two superpowers.

I saw the movie last night, "Clear and Present Danger." It seemed to me our President was made to look like a bad guy for making a decision—although he wimped out in the end of the movie. Yet, the decision to kill all those drug lords seemed to be the proper decision; I suggest that we may have to make the same decisions regarding certain Third World leaders who possess nuclear weapons in the future.

The question that arises then, is whether the public is going to accept that?

Mr. YANKELOVICH. I don't think so. Certainly in response to a movie, there is an enormous emotional release, but not when people have second thoughts.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The movie's aim was to convince people that that shouldn't have happened.

Mr. YANKELOVICH. What you see over and over again is that people's first reaction reflects impulses of violence, revenge, action; but their second thoughts are usually far more prudent. One of the drawbacks of instant polling is that you get people's first impulsive reaction before you get their considered judgment.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Frankly, my thought is that leaving people like Saddam Hussein alive is the least prudent option. This fact has come back to haunt us. People are more cautious in the beginning. I have a different analysis.

ASSESSING COST OF POLICY OPTIONS

Mr. GAFFNEY. If I may say quickly, Congressman, that comes back to the point Congressman Lantos was making. The cost of tradeoffs here. To have to fight by putting 550,000 men in the desert, women in the desert, and moving all that gear and running the risks of enormous casualties and imposing the destruction we did on Iraqi society against an effort to remove at its core the root cause of the problem is just mind-boggling to me.

The argument that it is more moral to impose economic sanctions that are in effect a weapon of mass destruction against societies rather than deal with such leadership is a very hard case to make, I think. I think the public would intuitively understand if there is leadership behind it.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Berman.

UTILITY OF POLLING DATA IN DECISIONMAKING

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Gulf war is a very interesting perspective to go off on a lot of this. I don't want to dwell too much on it.

Let me throw out a few things that upset me about what each of you have said and then get your reactions.

First, to Mr. Kohut, I don't want to be an ostrich, put my head in the sand, but I do want to challenge the fundamental premises of polling in a vacuum. You say people will support peacekeeping, but they will not support peacemaking; but we know that once it turned out to be successful and effective, one of the most popular

U.S. foreign policy ventures was a peacemaking venture in the Persian Gulf which the day before that intervention took place was a 50-50 kind of a proposition. Three days afterwards, when it looked successful, it was off the charts.

To let polls taken in a vacuum be a tremendous influence in determining what the country should be doing in a particular time I think causes more trouble and leads you into a kind of paralysis of action. So I just would be interested in your reaction to that.

VIEWS UNDERLYING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONALISM

I would like to ask Mr. Yankelovich, when you say there is a consensus for internationalism, all three of us on the panel agree; but then your statement premises it all on the assertion that its good for the economy. I wonder if there is really such a consensus, because if the tension point is domestic versus foreign, the reason for it is because they believe domestic means "good for the economy."

Any foreign policy that is fundamentally premised on what is good for the economy, what produces jobs for Americans is not what I consider a fundamental understanding of America's role in the world. It is obviously a critical element of our foreign policy and a critical element of our economy. I think our economic relationships could die if we isolated ourselves from the world. That is part of why I supported some of these things like NAFTA, GATT, and other issues.

But there is something deeper in terms of both America's national security interests and something about American values and commitment to pluralism, democracy, I think, which if the American people are not accepting as the premise for their international involvement, then I am not sure they are really internationalists or that there is the consensus for internationalism that you assert.

EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

Finally, to Mr. Gaffney, the interesting thing about your testimony—and all the faxes I get from you—at least you in this world have a point of view; I appreciate that. It is a very well-argued one.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. BERMAN. The thing that drives me crazy is that your point of view seems unaffected by the complexities of the problems. That is part of the reason for your good argumentation.

First of all, I would be interested—but I don't think this is the time—to hear your conceptualization, articulation of a coherent security policy in the context of the end of the cold war, if you assume the cold war has ended.

Secondly, this notion of the folly of abandoning controls on the export of strategic dual-use technologies, I couldn't agree with you more, except do we not need to ask if it is a control that essentially has no impact on what technologies are getting into other people's hands because they are so available from another country? In other words, there are balancing questions here which need to be asked.

I know, as one who errs on the side you state, not abandoning controls where we give people something, but I can certainly accept the premise that in this complicated world people can get their hands on technologies anyway. We may be doing something fundamental to the economy that far outweighs the benefits of with-

holding that specific technology, and that there is a balance here that should be discussed and that I cannot quite accept the conclusion as an instructive guide on how to vote on every issue unless I know you are sharing the subtleties.

Anyway, those are a few of the points I wanted to hear you speak about.

PEACEMAKING/PEACEKEEPING DISTINCTION

Mr. KOHUT. Let me respond to your comments.

First, the distinction about support for peacemaking versus support for peacekeeping is not based upon questions in the abstract. They are based upon how the American public reacted to Bosnia and Somalia.

Mr. BERMAN. There is not a person—even Mr. Gaffney has not argued that we should put a peacemaking force of U.S. military personnel into Bosnia. I don't know anyone who has argued about—

Mr. GAFFNEY. Especially Mr. Gaffney.

Mr. BERMAN. You forget the issue of after the treaty, which could be called a peacekeeping force.

Mr. GAFFNEY. I wouldn't put it in there.

Mr. BERMAN. I know that.

In other words, no one suggested a peacemaking force of U.S. troops in Bosnia.

Mr. KOHUT. I am not suggesting that they did. What I am saying to you is that looking at a range of questions that polling organizations have asked about these situations, questions that bear on American forces making the peace in Somalia or running down warlords or making a nation out of a country in chaos, I find very little support.

On the other hand, participation in either NATO or U.N. peacekeeping roles once a situation has stabilized, if it is a relatively low-risk proposition, has a good deal of support.

The one distinction I want to come back to involves the way you opened up your statement: the Persian Gulf war enjoyed a great deal of support because it was successful. That is true. But in the end, that was not a peacemaking operation in the eyes of the American public; in the eyes of the American public, our national interests were at stake.

The polling, from the very beginning, showed the public felt it was the United States' responsibility to get Iraq out of Kuwait one way or the other. While there was a great debate about the use of force—and in the end, the public will always gravitate to an economic or diplomatic alternative if it is available—there was an underlying basis of support for the use of U.S. military forces if all else failed. Ultimately, that is what allowed for a base of public support there. Support was not based on the public's interest in making peace in the Mideast, but rather in the public's belief that our interests were at stake in this part of the world that contains a big chunk of the world's oil supply.

Mr. BERMAN. I don't have the time to get into a debate about this, but when you say "if all else failed," that is very different from tomorrow or today. The debate was about whether all else

would fail or not; and the people were split on that question until we went in, and then it became very popular.

Mr. KOHUT. In the end, by January, after the congressional debate and the Security Council's proclamation, the levels of public support for U.S. military involvement increased substantially.

PUBLIC PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ECONOMY

Mr. YANKELOVICH. Your challenge addressed to me, if I understand it correctly, is: if the concern with the economy is the number one priority, can it really be called internationalism?

Mr. BERMAN. If the commitment to internationalism is premised on whether it is good for the economy?

Mr. YANKELOVICH. The preoccupation with the economy began to happen before the end of the cold war. In the 1980's people began to feel that the threat to the United States was less military in character than it was loss of competitiveness on the economic front. If you recall, there was a debate at that time about how to define national security: Shouldn't one expand it from a purely military definition to include the economic dimension as well? That perception was deeply ingrained in the public view, to the point that people yearned for the end of the cold war partly for that reason. They said, "Thank goodness. We can now focus on the economic side of things."

Again, I will repeat, the economy is not the public's only concern, but if you ride roughshod over that primary concern, you will not get support for anything else.

We are all saying that you shouldn't mistake that preoccupation for isolationism because it does coexist with the feeling that the United States has other responsibilities. But it *is* a preoccupation, and there *is* a desire that the focus of our foreign policy shift from its traditional concerns to a more economic focus.

COMPONENTS OF POST-COLD WAR POLICY

Mr. GAFFNEY. Congressman——

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Gaffney.

Mr. GAFFNEY. If I may briefly respond, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman HAMILTON. Sure.

Mr. GAFFNEY. I can't tell you how gratified I am to know you read our faxes. I hope in them you find a degree of elaboration of the more general philosophy that I and my colleagues bring to these issues than you can do obviously in a 5- or 10-minute statement to the committee.

I would be delighted to undertake to write a national security strategy or define one for this administration. I regard it as sort of rooted fundamentally in the idea that we are a global power whose vital interests are not static, but dynamic, and are under siege from both friends and allies. As a result, that does create a very complex international situation, one in which we are going to have to have a multitude of instruments with which to deal with those challenges.

The ones I am, most frankly, concerned about are our military instruments, not because you would want to use them in every case but because I believe they are at risk and because I believe that economic and political and strategic calculations on the part of

some of our competitors, who are potential adversaries, are very much a function of their view of our military potential and the will to use military power.

So again, a very high order of abstraction: that is sort of fundamentally where I would stake out differences with this administration and urge Congress, in particular, to be mindful of the view that I think that that is what most Americans want our country to be about as well: a global power, internationally engaged, capable of looking out for its interests, able to influence, deter—or both—friends and adversaries and doing it fundamentally through a combination of political leadership, economic strength, and military power.

TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS

On the question of technology controls, this is indeed a complex issue. Basically, where I come down on it is this: any hope you have of preventing or even slowing—and that is probably the best we can hope for—the hemorrhage of exceedingly dangerous technologies to dangerous actors is shot once you announce as your policy that it is everybody for themselves. You dismantle the multilateral mechanism, COCOM, created expressly to try to manage a multilateral approach, and you show that there is really no restraint whatsoever, even on a unilateral basis. These are absolutely central to the Clinton administration's approach to export controls at the same moment that they profess to be exceedingly interested in combating proliferation. It is a schizophrenic view at best; at worst, it is mere lip service paid to the point of export controls and creating conditions under which we will not be able to exercise any influence whatsoever in this area.

Thank you.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

CALL FOR GOAL-DIRECTED FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for your calling a timely hearing as we get into some very critical foreign policy issues that are before the country. The question of building broad public support for our foreign policy decisions is certainly extremely critical in our post-cold war period when traditional structures and approaches have to be revised with all of the new challenges we see out there.

Sustaining support for foreign policy initiatives has never been easy. It becomes more difficult as we seek to identify and define our vital U.S. national interests, especially when we have very little time these days, from one crisis to another, to get to the public with the kind of information and the kind of opinion-building that has to be brought to bear on these problems by the administration.

It would seem, however, building public support depends upon the ability of any administration to first formulate a distinct policy that meets the tests of our needs and then clearly explaining that policy to the public. We in the Congress have that difficulty continually, every weekend when we go back to our constituents, to try to put it in a language that they will understand and also to give the background of why we are at that point. We are continually building public opinion out there in the hinterlands. Trying to mar-

shal public support for foreign policy decisions without regard to their worth is putting the cart before the horse, and too often we find that that is happening with a number of the issues before us.

Take, for example, the Haitian problem now. Our military is off-shore; hostility is possibly imminent; trying to convince our Nation that this is an important step.

Former President George Bush's actions following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, I think, is a textbook example of how working things through in proper order garnered broad-based public support for the post-cold war foreign policy; and President Bush stated his objective clearly, his action plan, and the merits of his choices. He did not waiver or change his stance in the face of opposition. He garnered international support, as well as domestic support, and clearly defined the reasoning behind the decisions.

Everyone may not have agreed with the Bush policy on the Persian Gulf, but all understood what our goals were and how we planned to attain it. As a result of that, he won the support of most Americans and the majority of the Congress which incidentally was built upon a very thorough debate that we had in the Congress, which gave everyone an opportunity to take part. That, in itself, I think, educated the public who were watching, listening, and reading about it, who came to have a better understanding.

I think, in part, regarding foreign policy initiatives, to command support these days, any administration has to put the cart back behind the horse where it belongs by clearly stating goals and how we plan to achieve those goals. So that I welcome the panelists who are here today.

I am still reminded, even in the Congress we had 110 new members elected in the last election. You remember the columnist that started questioning some of the newer members: what are we going to do about the poor people in Fredonia? You remember those responses? They said, yes, it is time we helped out those poor people, which means that even in the Congress, we have a lot of educating to do in regard to these issues.

Now, if my colleagues here are continually working on foreign policy issues, those who are working on other areas too often neglect those issues and too often fail to give a proper response out there when they are with the public about how important these issues are and how they affect us domestically.

Mr. Yankelovich, you mentioned the connection between the economy and these issues if the connection between foreign policy and U.S. self-interest is asserted, how can the public be made to see it and support it even if the goals are long range?

Well, what will it take to achieve that? I address that to Mr. Yankelovich.

ARTICULATING A FOREIGN POLICY PLAN

Mr. YANKELOVICH. Thank you. I think your point about putting the cart before the horse is extremely well taken. When people are asked about the Clinton foreign policy, the main criticism that the public has is that he doesn't seem to have a plan. Americans fear that he approaches things in an ad hoc way. What you are talking about is the enunciation of a plan that would specify certain goals, lessons, and strategies, and then relate specific actions to them.

That proactive step is missing, with it missing, we are destined to lurch from crisis to crisis where average Americans never quite digest what the issues are.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Congressman.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Kohut.

MAKING THE CASE FOR A HAITI INTERVENTION

Mr. KOHUT. I think Haiti is a good example to apply to the statements you just made. The American public's inclination is to not support military involvement in Haiti. I think that the objective of leadership here, if a decision is made to use military force, ought to be to build public support by making the connection with things that the public values.

I saw Roper polls recently that showed more public support for military involvements to combat drugs, to stem the illegal immigration than to defend some allies. I can't remember what countries were tested. They have these scenario questions where they measure levels of support for this country and that country. In any event, there was substantial support for using American forces to stem the flow of drugs and to stem illegal immigration. You have to build support with the public on a basis by which you can make a connection. The connections now have to do not only with the economies as we have all talked about, but also with other high domestic agenda items such as drug abuse, illegal immigration. These are problems of great concern to the public. If you want to make a case for Haiti, you have to make it on the terms and in the language that the public is receptive to.

ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Gaffney.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Congressman, on the point Mr. Kohut just made, I suspect—although I could not prove this, that that very poll or focus group finding may explain why all of a sudden the administration surfaced this notion that there is a lot of drug dealing going on in Haiti, so we have to go into Haiti and clean this thing out.

The least likely place that drug dealing is going on is in Haiti today, at least in terms of exporting it into the United States, given the naval and air blockade we have in place there.

I would just say there is a process issue here that is very important. You addressed several different points during the course of the discussion. The Persian Gulf War is an imperfect model in a number of respects. I think there are good lessons to be learned from it, but there are dangerous ones, too. One of the dangerous ones from a process point of view is that in instances where we have arguably vital interests at stake, and we need to generate public support for an action, particularly a military action, we may not find ourselves dealing with an adversary who is going to give us 6 months to get ready to prepare militarily, on the one hand, and to prepare our public and congressional support and so on, on the other. Things need to be done in many instances far more quickly than that; some of them are genuine emergencies. Some of them are highly controversial steps that will require groundwork laying and so on.

CALL FOR GREATER CONGRESSIONAL ENGAGEMENT

I am really concerned. I must tell you as a former congressional staff member, as well as a former member of the executive branch, I think Congress is getting written out of the picture here on any number of these initiatives that clearly are going to require public support over time, whether it is an invasion of Haiti, which may happen while you are in a recess—if you ever get a recess—or whether it is sending peacekeeping troops to the Golan Heights or whether it is, you know, sending \$250 million into Rwanda. There seems to be no formal process here for ensuring that this enjoys congressional support, let alone public support, before we start paying costs associated with it.

Mr. GILMAN. Of course, that is what the War Powers Resolution was all about, that whole debate to try to bring it back into the Congress. That still gives a lot of leeway to any administration to engage in emergency measures until the Congress comes in after a certain period of time.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Plus we are talking about a host of activities here that are really not war related. That is something else.

THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION

Mr. GILMAN. Let me ask just one other question. I know my time has run, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.

Does the media either convince or dissuade its audience in foreign policy? Does the media have that much of an influence today to convince people that foreign policy is right or wrong?

Mr. YANKELOVICH. Media does that in a vacuum. It doesn't do it if there isn't a vacuum. On some of these issues, there has been a vacuum.

The formula that scholars have used about the media is that it does not dictate what the public should think; but it does dictate what the public should think about. The media do the agenda-setting. What the media highlights is what Americans focus on, but it doesn't dictate what they think about these subjects.

Mr. KOHUT. Nor does it dictate priorities.

I think one of the most interesting cases of how little impact the media has had is all of the coverage of Bosnia. For 2 years, we saw for the first time since the Second World War on our television screens Europeans dying, pictures of terrible human tragedy. It had very little impact on the public's interest in what was going on in the former Yugoslavia. Certainly, it had only limited impact on the public's belief that we have a responsibility to do something there.

In many ways, the impact of the media, of the news media is very much overexaggerated.

Mr. GAFFNEY. I think I disagree with that. The problem with Bosnia is well understood by this committee. It is sort of an open-ended affair. That does not lend itself to media, particularly the television media that have a short attention span and must move on.

The fact that we are going into Rwanda, I suggest to you, is that there is a finite, easily understood emergency of a compelling humanitarian nature to be sure; but it lends itself to sound bites,

evening news stories and quick responsive action on the part of policymakers. I think that that is much more illustrative of the impact, both as to what the influence of the media is in causing people to think about things and causing them to think certain things about what they think about.

Mr. GILMAN. I want to thank our panelists for their comments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this hearing. I yield back my time.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Hastings.

HOW THE POLLING QUESTIONS ARE FRAMED

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I too thank you for holding these hearings and thank our panelists who have been very forthcoming and candid in their reflections. I am deeply appreciative.

Like my colleagues I would like to ramble a moment on several points. I would like to borrow the last statement of Mr. Kohut to show you how, at least in my judgment, we might very well be able to build the kind of support we need for certain actions that may be perceived as policy in the foreign arena and use the Haiti situation.

The reason there is little public support—and obviously this administration has an idea about polling data—is that the question that is asked is always the wrong question. The question asked—if you in this room asked the question, do you favor military intervention in Haiti, the likelihood is very strong that most of us would answer no.

If you ask the question, if you knew that 20,000 Haitians were going to be in Honduras and 10,000 were going to be in Panama and 5,000 were going to be in Antigua and 20,000 would arrive in Miami; and America was going to have to take care of them, would you favor military intervention to stop that? Then the answer is, yes, you see.

Therefore, I would—that is how I think they do not go about polling correctly and/or trying to build support in this regard.

DIFFICULTIES FACING POST-COLD WAR POLICYMAKERS

The other thing, borrowing from you, Mr. Gaffney, that is borne out by the public polling data, the public is in an isolationist mood. I thoroughly agree, but I don't find that alarmist because historically, any time there are hard times, people become more inclined to fold anyway. Like all of you, I think that what you have asked us today and suggested to us is what I agree with. That is that we need leadership and we need leadership with vision. I am not certain in this era that any of us understand what that means.

For example, there is a leadership that obviously has to come from the executive branch. There is a leadership that comes from the legislative branch, which has in it disparate views, partisanship, diverse opinions, diverse backgrounds, 535 *prima donnas* all going off in 535 different directions. It is very hard to find a cohesive focus.

Here is where the media has advantages. The media does have for the moment a cohesive focus. They come in on it and zero in

on it and impact all our views as to what public policy ought to be at a given time.

In these arenas, why I don't believe we can have a finite strategy that is concretized, is that all of this is on shifting sand. If you are today dealing with Rwanda, tomorrow you deal with Burma. If you deal with Burma tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, you deal with another arena somewhere in the world. The world is in a state of flux.

It is hard from a leadership point of view to coordinate all of that into one strategic undertaking, and that is what we seem to be being asked, not by you but by everybody to do. That is what I think we are doing every day.

I think the Clinton policy, for example, on economics is clear. It is that the message is filtered. The message being filtered doesn't get out to the American public very well.

How do we handle some of these things? I am here a year-and-a-half as a new Member of Congress. Yesterday, we had the most historic moment—perhaps not the singularly most historic thing, but the most historic moment that was vividly portrayed by the actions of Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein. That is a one-day story. The historical significance of what transpired might be a model that this administration and those of us here might wish to build on to argue to other leaders of the world, if these things can happen, then why can't you, too, come to some agreement even though you have been archenemies, been at war with each other, whether it is Africa, Asia, wherever we are in the world.

What we are subjected to and do not have a handle on over here is CNN-ism and sound byte-ism. Many of us are not skilled to handle foreign policy in a glimpse. That is where the American public is misled by leaders and the media. I think it needs to be focused on, and I think you all have given us clear directions today.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me ramble.

Chairman HAMILTON. Any reaction? Mr. Gaffney.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS DOUBTFUL

Mr. GAFFNEY. If I might, Congressman, just for the record, I think a case can be made for putting U.S. forces into Haiti to end the present problem, especially on the grounds that you have described of both the humanitarian and economic dimensions of immigration from that country in part—not entirely, but in part a function of the hardship that we have wrought with our sanctions policy.

But my only point is that I think if we do decide to do that, neither the Congress nor the government more generally will be well served, to say nothing of the nation, if there has not been some recognition that this is not a one-day story. Removing the present government or the leadership of the Haitian Government and trying to install Mr. Aristide is not going to happen in one day, or it is not going to last more than one day, unless we have continuing commitment, presence; and I think long-term willingness to help support democratic institution-building in that country and economic rehabilitation.

I think that that is a much larger problem than the antipathy of the American people to sending troops in. There is even less interest, as far as I can tell, in making that kind of long-term—

DIFFICULTY OF MAINTAINING PROACTIVE POLICIES

Mr. HASTINGS. I certainly agree.

I want to go back to another of your points with the Chair's permission. That is, in the Rwandan situation, your disagreement or at least seeming disagreement with how we are spending the money, where the money will come from at this point in time.

Clearly, we could have envisioned that something was going to happen there. Those of us on the Subcommittee on Africa and on the Committee on Foreign Affairs knew that something was brewing. We knew it in advance. We said so. Yet this static thing called the Defense Department just kind of sat around and didn't do what we thought should have been done.

You seem to suggest, Mr. Gaffney, that we ought to be able to predict and/or prepare for the Rwandas of the world. I disagree. The reason that I do is because I don't think you can prepare for a nation, 1 million people, to move. What do you do? Are we now then to prepare for two nations to move at once? How do you do that? That is why I say our foreign policy is always on shifting sand. I don't think we can concretize it—although your response to Howard Berman does give a strategic outline.

I agree with that.

CALL FOR PRINCIPLE-DIRECTED POLICY

Mr. GAFFNEY. That was my other point. I think I disagreed with something that the Chairman said at the outset—if I understood you correctly, Mr. Chairman—that we do not have any principles that sort of abide during this period. I think we clearly ought to have principles and we can talk about what they might be. I tried to allude to some of them in response to the earlier question. You do have to tailor your implementation of them to specific circumstances.

I think it is a bad rap, Congressman, frankly, to blame the failure to act on the Defense Department. I think that is a failure again of a leadership decision north of the Pentagon.

What I am concerned about is not that we are doing the wrong thing, but who is going to pay for it and what kind of process is being built that establishes that it just doesn't eat out of defense resources, which I think are already stretched too thin for the kind of messy world we are moving into.

Mr. YANKELOVICH. It may be that where the next crisis is going to come from is unpredictable, but what I think is much more unpredictable is the fact that the world's policeman role issue has not been resolved. We can expect reliably more crises of that kind to arise over and over again. If that is the case, then the public can be prepared in advance with a set of principles which can be debated and endorsed. I think everybody would find life a lot easier if that were to happen.

SUPPORT LACKING FOR U.S. ROLE AS WORLD POLICEMAN

Mr. KOHUT. I would just add one comment. I think this is a place where Mr. Yankelovich and I disagree.

Selling the concept of America as a policeman in a general sense is a very, very difficult sell. I don't know how you make that case to the American public. Making it in terms of world order and keeping the world in check is a very difficult thing.

I was listening to you talk about the range of problems that confront this committee. Think about the public. The public sort of throws its hands up: Rwanda, Burma, Haiti. The indifference we see in these continuing surveys we do about how much attention the public is paying to these issues reflects not only the fact that the public is concerned with its own problems, but that it is overwhelmed with all of the things that are happening in the world.

In the old days, years ago, the public had to keep an eye on one thing: How were we doing—this is an exaggeration, obviously—relative to the Soviet Union? Now the picture is so complicated. There is not a clear and easy answer to your question. I don't see a clear and easy way to sell the notion of America as the world's policeman or the marshal of planet Earth to the American public.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Fingerhut.

INABILITY TO CONTROL FOREIGN CRISES

Mr. FINGERHUT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was going to focus my ramblings on two points but I was provoked to add a third by this last discussion of Rwanda.

Mr. Gaffney, you said it is a bad rap to blame the problem on the Pentagon, it belongs north of the Pentagon. I think it is a bad rap to blame anybody west of the Atlantic Ocean for it. The fact is there are things we do not control, we shouldn't control. That frankly adds to these seemingly inferiority complexes we have about our failures, which I think sometimes are much exaggerated.

Mr. Hastings referred to a historic moment here yesterday. Clearly, we hope that has broad implications. One thing that struck me is that the leader of the State of Israel, whose people speak Hebrew, and the leader of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, whose people speak Arabic, came to this country to speak English to declare that the war was over. If we are not proud of that, we ought to cash in our chips.

CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

The two points I wanted to ask your comment on are these:

Number one, the role of Congress in helping to shape foreign policy decisions. Clearly, Congress is given a role of some primacy by the Constitution. We all want to exercise that. I think Mr. Gilman mentioned appropriately that the sequencing of decisions referred to in the context, Mr. Gilman, of Desert Storm is critical. Let me make a couple of examples.

In the case of Desert Storm, the administration set a policy and then appropriately came to Congress and said, according to the Constitution, we seek this ratification. I understand that is an oversimplification, but the fact is that in the public's mind any-

way—I wasn't in Congress—the sequencing was administration policy, congressional approval, action.

You raised the point of the Golan Heights in your testimony, both in the written and in your spoken statement. I disagree with you that we should debate that issue now. I think the administration needs to bring us to a further point with respect to the peace between Israel and Syria and then come to Congress before we make those commitments.

Haiti is a perfect example. It seems to me there is now a role for Congress. We are close. The issue of military intervention is clearly out there. The administration brought troops in force; at some point there needs to be a decision.

I would like your comments on how we sequence this so we do not undermine public confidence, don't undermine the administration, but do exercise the constitutional role and perhaps enhance the public's impression of foreign policy by how the Congress gets involved.

IMPLICATIONS OF POLICY OF ECONOMIC PRIMACY

The second rambling point, you each in one respect or another focused on the public's support of economic interests as a primary goal in American foreign policy. I agree with Mr. Hastings, this is something the administration tried to push. Clearly our relations with Japan and the Far East have been affected by this emphasis—China, MFN, all the kinds of issues that have been out there. I would like to suggest to you if that really is the primary focus of American foreign policy and we pursue that, we are facing far-reaching consequences that the public has not come to grips with.

For example, our traditional alliances will no longer be the unifying force. In fact, it will be a disunifying force in the alliance. The European community doesn't particularly want us to be in bed with the American economy. Those are competitive economies, the Far East, et cetera.

I have heard nothing but criticism, particularly from the more conservative side of the political debate, about our policy toward Japan, because it affected our ability to act in Korea when the North Korean situation came up, et cetera. I have real questions about people understanding anywhere near what the implications of a policy of economic primacy are.

I ask for your comments.

U.S. PEACEKEEPERS IN THE GOLAN

Mr. GAFFNEY. If I may, Congressman, I guess I see a very important difference between the sequence that was required in the aftermath of essentially an act of war, which we felt was an act of war against our vital interests—which, as I mentioned, we had the luxury of moving rather ponderously in response to, but we nonetheless were responding to a military action that somebody had taken—and the kind of proposition that is now under consideration; and I believe about to be announced in terms of putting U.S. peacekeeping forces on the Golan Heights. That is not an act of war. That is an initiative being taken notionally as the underpinning for a peace agreement.

All I am suggesting is, before a commitment is made to do that, somebody needs to evaluate—I would hope it would be the Congress of the United States—with the public, with the press, whether that is in fact a durable, reliable basis for a peace agreement that will involve very considerable risks for Israel.

Mr. FINGERHUT. My point is, I don't think Israel agrees with that. The sequencing, ought it not be in the context of an overall policy which is on the table for us to evaluate?

What I see happening, what I see you supporting—and I don't mean to single this out, because I want an answer to all the rest, but what I see happening in that context is the building of an agitation within the Senate, the letters, the resolutions that then create an issue before it is ripe as the context of a policy. I think that that can undermine the public's perception before a policy which may make sense presents itself.

Mr. GAFFNEY. I guess I would respond by saying I am much more concerned about the implications of having failed to have this debate now, than the implications of having it debated now, very simply for this reason: That if the past experience is right, where we have seen a breakthrough take place in the Middle East, and essentially your good selves, among others, are put in a fait accompli position you cannot be critical of, for example, waiving all of the U.S. laws that relate to the PLO as a terrorist organization.

You cannot second-guess the wisdom, if there is any second-guessing to be done, of providing military equipment to the Kingdom of Jordan. You are essentially put—once that is accomplished, once, as you say, it is all put together as a package and presented to you, you are essentially pulled in a position of being an enemy of peace, a circumstance which, at least in my experience, very few of us want to be. As a result, there is no debate.

My principal concern here is, I believe the Congress will find itself, as Americans are killed on the Golan Heights because of the very vulnerability we talked about previously—despite the fact they may be wearing blue berets and are in a peacekeeping mode, they are Americans, they are targets. When that happens, as I believe it will, Congress will be faced with the kind of pressure we have only discussed that came about in Somalia where, hey, nobody told the American people there were going to be casualties here. Nobody told them they were going to entail an open-ended commitment of forces in that dangerous situation.

All I am saying, Congressman, is if you decide in your wisdom that that is something that you are prepared to do and you think your constituents are prepared to support, so be it. Go for it. Put troops on the Golan Heights. I just hope that this is something you can decide about before you are in a position where any second-guessing of the idea constitutes a fundamental threat to the whole structure of a peace between Israel and Syria, which may be a very, very tentative thing otherwise.

I guess my bottom line is, I think sequence is important, process is important. In that specific instance, more generally, I would love to talk to you further about it.

The second point, economic security is not the sole definition of national security. I think this administration has made a number of very serious mistakes in sort of suggesting that all we need to

really be worried about now in the post-cold war is economic security. I think you are right in pointing that out.

Chairman HAMILTON. Gentlemen, we have a vote. The second bells have rung.

I had a number of other issues I wanted to explore with you, but the bells have saved you from further questioning. So we will adjourn, with our thanks to you for an excellent discussion this morning. We appreciate it greatly.

We stand adjourned.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



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